Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank-dependent utility theory. Under rankdependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude of a decision maker. The same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion: utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion. The main finding is that these two forms can have surprisingly opposite consequences for bargaining solutions that exhibit a weak monotonicity property. In particular, in a large class of bargaining problems both increased utility risk aversion and decreased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent are advantagous for a player. This is demonstrated for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution does not behave regularly in this respect. r
Introduction
A bargaining problem is described by a set of potential outcomes, including a socalled disagreement outcome. The bargainers try to reach agreement on one of the outcomes or on a lottery between these outcomes. If they fail, the disagreement outcome results. A bargaining solution suggests an agreement outcome or lottery for each possible bargaining problem. In this paper, the so-called welfarist approach to bargaining is adopted. In this approach, the solution to the bargaining problem depends exclusively on its image in utility space.
The axiomatic approach to two-person bargaining problems was initiated by Nash [9] , under the assumption that the two bargainers maximize expected utility. In expected utility, risk aversion is an important empirical phenomenon. Yaari [21] provides an intuitive definition of risk aversion and shows that under expected utility one decision maker is more risk averse than another if and only if the utility function of the former is a strictly increasing concave transformation of that of the latter. An interesting question, first studied by Kannai [7] and Kihlstrom et al. [8] , concerns the effect of risk aversion on the outcomes predicted by bargaining solutions. Their answers to this question confirm a plausible intuition: it is advantagous to play against a more risk averse bargainer. These results are driven by the fact that a more risk averse bargainer has a more concave utility function. Therefore, utility at low levels increases at a faster rate and satisfaction may appear faster. Because most bargaining solutions are sensitive to this, a more risk averse bargainer may be easier to satisfy, which is advantageous for the opponent (cf. [10] ).
Expected utility as a normative basis for decision making is appealing, but as empirical findings show, it is descriptively unsatisfactory. Therefore, alternative models have been developed of which rank-dependent utility [11] , which extends expected utility by allowing for distortion of probabilities, is the best known.
Our paper considers bargaining problems where the bargainers' preferences can be represented by rank-dependent utility. In this model Yaari's concept of increased risk aversion has still the same natural meaning: a more risk averse person prefers less lotteries over each riskless alternative. In contrast with expected utility, however, not only the utility function but also a probability weighting function determines the risk attitude of a decision maker. An elegant and simple characterization of increased risk aversion as in the case of expected utility is not yet available. Chateauneuf and Cohen [2] provide some partial results. Chew et al. [3] characterize aversion to mean-preserving spreads, which is more restrictive than risk aversion.
In the present paper, two factors of risk aversion are distinguished: utility risk aversion (as in the expected utility model), associated with the utility function; and probabilistic risk aversion, associated with the probability weighting function. In our application to bargaining we concentrate on the latter, because the results for the former are closely related to those in expected utility. As in the related literature, the central question is: is it advantagous or disadvantagous to bargain with a more risk averse person? In Section 3, we investigate the impact of both utility and probabilistic risk aversion for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution [6] . The main finding is that in a large class of bargaining problems, it is advantagous to have a less probabilistically risk averse, or a more utility risk averse opponent. The known effect of risk aversion for the expected utility case (cf. [8] ) is a special case of the latter result. Since both forms of risk aversion arise from the same concept of comparative risk aversion, this contrast is rather surprising. On closer inspection, however, it is not counterintuitive that increased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent could be bad for a player, because such an opponent might insist on larger probabilities for good alternatives and thereby reduce the other player's utility.
The two results also have some strategic implications, if it is assumed that bargainers can be dishonest about their true preferences and pretend to evaluate lotteries by means of a different utility or probability weighting function. Specifically, it does not pay to pretend to be less probabilistically risk averse, or more utility risk averse, but it might sometimes pay to pretend to be more probabilistically or less utility risk averse. For the expected utility case related papers in this direction are Crawford and Varian [4] and Sobel [17, 18] .
Although our focus is on the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution the main results in this paper can be extended to solutions that exhibit some form of monotonicity. Typically, these do not include the Nash bargaining solution. If this solution is used, a more probabilistically risk averse opponent might be better but also worse for a player. We justify the use of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in bargaining under rank-dependent utility by showing that the axiomatization of Kalai and Smorodinsky [6] still makes sense (see Section 4) .
Axiomatic bargaining without expected utility has been studied in other articles [1, [13] [14] [15] 22] . The paper of Volij and Winter [22] is closest to the present paper. It applies Yaari's dual theory of choice to bargaining problems where the set of alternatives consists of all distributions of one unit of a perfectly divisible good, and uses the stronger notion of aversion to mean-preserving spreads to study changes in the Nash solution. Shalev [16] has studied the effect of loss aversion-see also Section 5.
The proofs are collected in the appendix.
Preliminaries

Rank-dependent utility
Throughout, the set A of riskless alternatives is a nonempty compact topological space. A lottery is a probability measure with finite support on A; typically denoted by P ¼ ðp 1 ; a 1 ; y; p n ; a n Þ where a 1 ; y; a n AA; p i X0 for all i; and P n i¼1 p i ¼ 1: The set of all lotteries is LðAÞ: A riskless alternative aAA is identified with the lottery ð1; aÞALðAÞ:
A utility function U : A-R is a continuous function that assigns to each riskless alternative a real number, expressing its value for a decision maker. A weighting function is a continuous, strictly increasing function w : ½0; 1-½0; 1 with wð0Þ ¼ 0 and wð1Þ ¼ 1; representing the decision maker's personal appraisal of probabilities. For a decision maker with utility function U; the preferences over LðAÞ can be modelled by rank-dependent utility (RDU) if there exists a weighting function w; such that preferences are represented by the functional RDU : LðAÞ-R defined by where r is a permutation that orders the riskless alternatives in the lottery from best to worse, i.e., Uða rð1Þ ÞX?XUða rðnÞ Þ (cf. [11] ). Expected utility holds if wðpÞ ¼ p for all pA½0; 1:
Rank-dependent utility, in contrast to expected utility, permits transformations of probabilities. An alternative is weighted by the transformed probability of obtaining the alternative or something better minus the transformed probability of obtaining something better.
Comparative risk aversion
Yaari [20] introduced a natural definition of risk aversion. A decision maker is more risk averse than another one, if whenever the former (weakly) prefers a lottery to a riskless alternative the latter also does. In expected utility it is a well-known result that one decision maker is more risk averse than a second one if the utility function of the first is a strictly increasing concave transformation of that of the second. Under rank-dependent utility, a second component influences the risk attitude, namely, the weighting function. In the lemma below and in the rest of the paper, we consider these two components separately, by keeping one fixed and varying the other. If A is connected, the ''only if '' implication in part 2 of Lemma 2.2 also holds. In the situation of Lemma 2.2, part 1, we say that decision maker g DM DM is more utility risk averse than decision maker DM; whereas in the situation of Lemma 2.2, part 2, we say that g DM DM is more probabilistically risk averse than DM: Although the above result is well known and simple to prove, it was not yet stated as in Lemma 2.2. Part 1 of the lemma is a generalization of Yaari's result [20] for expected utility; a predecessor of part 2 can be found in [21] . A proof can also be deduced from Chateauneuf and Cohen [2] . A general characterization of comparative risk aversion that allows for varying utility and weighting functions at the same time, is not yet available.
Bargaining problems and solutions
As before, a nonempty compact topological space A is the set of riskless alternatives. Let RDU 1 and RDU 2 : LðAÞ-R be the RDU-functionals of two bargainers with utility functions U 1 and U 2 and weighting functions w 1 and w 2 ; respectively. A designated element % aAA is the disagreement alternative. We assume throughout that there is a lottery A bargaining solution is a map F : S-R 2 that assigns to each ðS; dÞAS an element of S: In the rest of the paper, we also write F ðBÞ instead of F ðSðBÞ; dðBÞÞ:
Feasible sets of bargaining problems
Under expected utility, the set of all possible feasible sets is the set of all compact convex sets in R 2 : Because of continuity of the weighting functions, a feasible set SðBÞ is connected under rank-dependent utility, but it is not necessarily convex. It does, however, satisfy a weaker form of convexity, as formulated in the following lemma.
For any points s and t in R 2 denote by ½s; t the straight line segment with s and t as endpoints, i.e., the convex hull of s and t: The vector inequality t4s means t i 4s i for i ¼ 1; 2; and tXs means t i Xs i for i ¼ 1; 2: This lemma implies in particular that a feasible set S is not only connected but also simply connected: it contains no 'holes' (cf. Lemma A.1 in the appendix).
For ðS; dÞAS the Pareto optimal set PðSÞ is defined by PðSÞ ¼ fsAS : there exists no tAS with tXs and tasg:
Instead of PðSðBÞÞ we also write PðBÞ:
The following lemma implies that the Pareto optimal set is connected. The next lemma provides a partial answer to the converse question: Which nonempty compact subsets S of R 2 can be generated as feasible sets of bargaining problems under rank-dependent utility? The lemma says that every connected compact Pareto optimal set can be generated by an underlying bargaining problem.
Lemma 2.5. Let ICR be a nonempty closed interval and let f : I-R be a continuous strictly decreasing function. Then there is a BAB such that PðBÞ is the graph of f, that is, PðBÞ ¼ fðt; f ðtÞÞ : tAIg:
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
For ðS; dÞAS; the utopia point is defined by uðS; dÞ ¼ ðmaxfs 1 : sAS; sXdg; maxfs 2 : sAS; sXdgÞ:
For BAB we also write uðBÞ instead of uðSðBÞ; dðBÞÞ: The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution KS [6] assigns to each ðS; dÞAS the maximal point of S on the line segment with d and uðS; dÞ as endpoints. It is well defined because S is compact. By Lemma 2.4, KSðS; dÞ is a Pareto optimal point for every ðS; dÞAS:
This is an adaptation of the definition of KS for expected utility to rank-dependent utility. Under expected utility, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can be justified and characterized by a set of axioms [6] . This axiomatization can be extended to the rank-dependent utility case, as we will show in Section 4.
Sensitivity of the KS bargaining solution to risk
We investigate the sensitivity of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to changes in the risk attitude of the bargainers. We first assume that both bargainers weakly prefer all riskless alternatives to the disagreement alternative, a condition which will be weakened in Section 3.4. We examine the changes in the outcome suggested by the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution if the risk aversion of one of the players changes. First, we keep the weighting function fixed and vary the utility function; second, we keep the utility function fixed and vary the weighting function. The first case is a generalization to rank-dependent utility of known results for expected utility.
Define B þ ¼ fBAB : sXdðBÞ for all sASðBÞg:
Utility risk aversion
Theorem 3.1. Let B and C be bargaining problems in B þ that are identical except that player 2 is more utility risk averse in C than in B. Then KS 1 ðBÞpKS 1 ðCÞ:
The theorem says that a player does not lose when bargaining with a (new) more utility risk averse opponent. Fig. 1 (a) illustrates this. In the figure, we use the fact that under rank-dependent utility, the utility function is unique up to scale and location and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisfies scale invariance (see Section 4), so player 2's utility function in bargaining problem C can be scaled such that dðBÞ ¼ dðCÞ and uðBÞ ¼ uðCÞ: Theorem 3.2 says that a player does not profit from bargaining with a (new) more probabilistically risk averse opponent. This is illustrated in Fig. 1(b) , where the utility functions of players 2 in B and C are taken to be equal (cf. Lemma 2.2, part 2, and recall that KS is scale invariant).
Observe that both in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 the players 2 in B and C are different players, so that neither these results nor the associated diagrams imply anything about gains or losses of these players. See also the discussion below.
Discussion and strategic implications
Although utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion have a similar impact on the preferences of a decision maker, namely, the more utility or probabilistically risk averse a player is, the less lotteries are preferred over each sure alternative, they have contrary effects in bargaining problems with respect to the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. An intuition for this is as follows. If a player can choose between a more and a less utility risk averse opponent, it is advisable to choose the more utility risk averse one, because the marginal utility of the more utility risk averse player diminishes faster, so that this player is easier to satisfy. But if a player can choose between a more and a less probabilistically risk averse opponent, it is advisable to choose the less probabilistically risk adverse one, because the more probabilistically risk averse player weighs probabilities for alternatives with high outcomes lower and therefore asks for more security for obtaining high outcomes.
These considerations represent a positive view: they are of interest for the case in which the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution offers a good description of the bargaining outcome. Additionally, it is interesting to consider the strategic implications of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 for a bargainer under the assumption that preferences are private knowledge, so that it is possible to be dishonest about the true preferences. These implications are relevant from a normative point of view, in particular, for the question of mechanism design.
Let B ¼ ðA; % a; RDU 1 ; RDU 2 Þ be a bargaining problem, where RDU 2 corresponds to the true preferences of player 2. We consider four cases, namely that player 2 pretends to be more or less utility or probabilistically risk averse. For simplicity, it is assumed for the rest of this subsection that A is finite. This ensures that the image of LðAÞ in R 2 is closed and, therefore, it also ensures the existence of a lottery with rank-dependent utility image equal to the point suggested by the Kalai Hence, pretending to be more probabilistically risk averse can be advantagous (player 2 in the pair % B; % C) but also disadvantagous (player 2 in the pair B; C). &
Extension from B þ to B
In this subsection the restrictions in Theorem 3.2 on bargaining problems are weakened. Riskless alternatives are permitted that are worse than the disagreement alternative for one or both players. In the following, we only consider the effect of weighting functions. For results concerning utility risk aversion in the expected utility case, see [12] .
Unfortunately, Theorem 3.2 cannot be generalized to an arbitrary compact set A of riskless alternatives without any further restrictions, as the following example shows. Condition (1) says that the line segment with dðCÞ and uðCÞ as endpoints is steeper (has a higher slope) than the line segment with dðBÞ and uðBÞ as endpoints. If dðBÞ ¼ dðCÞ-which can always be arranged without loss of generality-condition (1) holds in particular if U 1 ðaÞXd 1 ðBÞ for all aAA; that is, if player 1 weakly prefers all riskless alternatives to the disagreement alternative.
An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for rank-dependent utility bargaining problems can be characterized by a similar set of conditions as in the expected utility case (see [6] Weak Pareto optimality: For every ðS; dÞAS there is no xAS with x4F ðS; dÞ: Individual monotonicity: For all ðS; dÞ; ð % S; % dÞAS and all iajAf1; 2g with (i) % SDS; (ii) % d ¼ d; and (iii) u i ð % S; % dÞ ¼ u i ðS; dÞ; we have F j ð % S; % dÞpF j ðS; dÞ: Observe that these conditions still make sense in the rank-dependent utility setting. In particular, scale invariance reflects the fact that the utility function in rankdependent utility is unique up to a positive linear transformation. Also the following characterization is similar to the one obtained in [6] but in the proof (see the appendix) the construction of auxiliary bargaining problems needs special attention because of the different domain, in particular the presence and construction of nonconvex problems. 
Conclusion
It has been shown in this paper that, with respect to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, in many situations it is on the one hand not advantagous to bargain against a more probabilistically risk averse opponent, but on the other hand also not advantagous to bargain against a less utility risk averse opponent. These results are surprising, since both probabilistic and utility risk aversion arise from the same definition of risk aversion. The intuition behind the results could be that a more utility risk averse bargainer is easier to satisfy and is therefore less demanding in a bargaining problem, whereas a more probabilistically risk averse bargainer wants a higher guarantee to obtain good outcomes and is therefore more demanding. In this paper, we varied the attitude towards risk either with respect to the weighting function or with respect to the utility function, and kept the other component fixed. It may be interesting to design an experiment to test which of the two components has more influence in bargaining problems.
The main results can be generalized to n-person bargaining problems with the restriction that the feasible sets are made comprehensive. It is also possible to adapt the results to bargaining solutions exhibiting certain monotonicity properties. For instance, the egalitarian bargaining solution defined on the set of comprehensive problems or the Kalai-Rosenthal solution [5] are such candidates.
The extension of the Nash bargaining solution [9] to bargaining problems under rank-dependent utility is more problematic. In particular, feasible sets are not necessarily convex, so that the Nash bargaining solution is not uniquely defined. Nevertheless, even if we restrict attention to bargaining problems where the Nash bargaining solution is well defined, it does not behave regularly. Both cases can arise: a player can gain or lose with respect to the Nash bargaining solution when bargaining with a more probabilistically risk averse opponent.
Cumulative prospect theory [19] differs from rank-dependent utility in the sense that probabilities are weighted in a different way, depending on whether the associated riskless alternatives are preferred to a specific reference point or not. All of the above results can be generalized to cumulative prospect theory. There, a distinction between gains and losses is made, and a third factor influences the risk attitude of a decision maker, namely loss aversion. The impact of loss aversion in bargaining problems is a subject for further research. Also Shalev [16] considers loss aversion in bargaining but in a quite different framework.
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We say that a feasible set S has a hole if there is an hAR 2 and an e40 such that (i)
xeS for all xAR 2 with jjx À hjjoe and (ii) for every xAR 2 with xa0 there is a number l x 40 with h þ l x xAS:
Lemma A. Without loss of generality, assume that all probabilities in P and Q are positive, and let C ¼ fa 1 ; y; a k ; b 1 ; y; b n g: Let U 2 be the utility function of player 2.
Case 1: For all cAC; U 2 ðcÞ ¼ s 2 : Then all lotteries on elements of C have rankdependent utility equal to s 2 for player 2 and all points in ½s; t can be obtained by such lotteries. Hence, ½s; tDT:
Case 2: There are c;cAC with U 2 ðcÞaU 2 ðcÞ: Let % cAarg maxfU 2 ðcÞ : cACg and % cAarg minfU 2 ðcÞ : cACg: Clearly, U 2 ð% cÞ4s 2 4U 2 ð % cÞ: Let R ¼ ðr; % c; 1 À r; % cÞ be the unique lottery with RDU 2 ðRÞ ¼ s 2 : Let r ¼ ðRDU 1 ðRÞ; RDU 2 ðRÞÞ; then we will show that the straight line segment between s and r is in T: Similarly, it can be shown that the straight line segment between r and t is in T: Therefore, the straight line segment between s and t is contained in T:
Observe
i ; there exist some l; pX0 with l þ p ¼ e such that for the lottery e P e P e ¼ ðp 1 ; a 1 ; y;p iÀ1 ; a iÀ1 ; p i À e; a i ;p iþ1 ; a iþ1 ; y;p k ; a k ;p kþ1 þ l; % c;p kþ2 þ p; % cÞ we have RDU 2 ð e P e P e Þ ¼ s 2 : Starting with P we now gradually construct new lotteries with RDU 2 -value equal to s 2 by shifting, for every a i ef% c; % cg; the corresponding decision weight p i in a continuous way, simultanously to % c and % c until we reach R; such that the RDU 2 -value stays constant. In this way, we obtain every point on the straight line segment between s and r as the image of at least one of the contructed lotteries. This completes the proof of the claim. & We now continue with the proof of the lemma. Assume for contradiction that T contains an almost-hole, and let hAR 2 be as in the definition of an almost-hole. In particular, there exist l ð1;0Þ ; l ðÀ1;0Þ 40 with h þ l ð1;0Þ ð1; 0Þ; h þ l ðÀ1;0Þ ðÀ1; 0ÞAT; or there exist l ð0;1Þ ; l ð0;À1Þ 40 with h þ l ð0;1Þ ð0; 1Þ; h þ l ð0;À1Þ ð0; À1ÞAT: Assume the former is the case, the latter is analogous. Observe that ðh þ l ð1;0Þ ð1; 0ÞÞ 2 ¼ ðh þ l ðÀ1;0Þ ðÀ1; 0ÞÞ 2 ¼ h 2 : Hence the claim implies that ½h À l ðÀ1;0Þ ð1; 0Þ; h þ l ð1;0Þ ð1; 0ÞDT: In particular, hAT; which contradicts (i) in the definition of an almost-hole. Therefore, T contains no almost-holes and the proof of the lemma is complete. &
The following lemma is needed to derive Lemma 2.4.
Lemma A.2. Let B ¼ ðA; % a; RDU 1 ; RDU 2 ÞAB with utility functions U 1 and U 2 and weighting functions w 1 and w 2 for players 1 and 2, respectively. Let % b 2 Aarg maxfU 2 ðaÞ: aAAg and % b 1 Aarg maxfU 1 ðaÞ: aAAg: Let S ¼ SðBÞ and xAPðSÞ: Then
Þ then for every e40 there is a yAS with y 1 ox 1 ; y 2 4x 2 ; and jjx À yjjoe; (ii) if x 1 oU 1 ð % b 1 Þ then for every e40 there is a yAS with y 2 ox 2 ; y 1 4x 1 ; and jjx À yjjoe:
Proof. We only prove (i), the proof of (ii) is analogous. Suppose that (i) is not true. Together with xAPðSÞ this implies that there is a # e40 such that S-fyAR 2 : jjy À xjjo# e; y 2 4x 2 g ¼ |:
Let PALðAÞ be an arbitrary lottery with RDU 2 ðPÞpx 2 : Such a lottery is of the form P ¼ ðp 0 ; % b 2 ; p 1 ; a 1 ; y; p n ; a n Þ with U 2 ð % b 2 ÞXU 2 ða 1 ÞX?XU 2 ða n Þ; and possibly, p 0 ¼ 0:
There is a number 0p % po1; independent of P, such that p
Proof. Let % b 2 Aarg minfU 2 ðaÞ : aAAg: Since RDU 2 ðPÞpx 2 we have x be the point of S with maximal first coordinate among the points of S with maximal second coordinate. Similarly, let % x be the point of S with maximal second coordinate among the points of S with maximal first coordinate. Clearly, % x and % x are Pareto optimal points, and for every point xAPðSÞ we have % x 1 px 1 p % x 1 : To prove the lemma it is sufficient to prove that for every aAR with % x 1 pap % x 1 there is a number f ðaÞAR with ða; f ðaÞÞAPðSÞ: such a number must then be unique and the implied function f is strictly decreasing and, by Lemma A.2, also continuous. Hence, f satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
For a ¼ % Proof of Lemma 2.3. We first observe that the points of S with maximal second coordinates form a straight line segment, possibly consisting of only one point: all these points can be obtained by lotteries between riskless alternatives with minimal and maximal utility for player 1 among all the riskless alternatives that have maximal utility for player 2. The same is true for all points with minimal second coordinates, or maximal or minimal first coordinates. Let s; tAS be points that have one coordinate in common. Without loss of generality assume s 1 ot 1 and s 2 ¼ t 2 : If s 2 is maximal or minimal in S then ½s; tDS follows from the observations in preceding paragraph. Otherwise, any point hA½s; t strictly between s and t satisfies condition (ii) in the definition of a hole: this follows from the observations in the preceding paragraph and from Lemma A.3. Suppose that there would be such an h with heS: Since S is closed there must be an eneigborhood of h that is not in S: Hence, h satisfies also condition (i) in the definition of a hole, and thus S has a hole. This contradicts Lemma A.1 and completes the proof. & Proof of Lemma 2.5. Let I ¼ ½a; b: If aab; define the continuous strictly increasing function w : ½0; 1-½0; 1 by 
From (5) and (6), So it is sufficient to prove that KSðT; 0Þ ¼ F ðT; 0Þ: Note that uðT; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ and, therefore, KS 1 ðT; 0Þ ¼ KS 2 ðT; 0Þ: Let C ¼ ðA; % a; RDU 1 ; RDU 2 ÞAB such that T ¼ SðCÞ and 0 ¼ dðCÞ: Let U 1 and U 2 be the associated utility functions.
First consider the case that uðT; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1ÞAT; hence KSðT; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ: Since, by Lemma 2.4, PðTÞ ¼ fð1; 1Þg; there must be an aAA with ð1; 1Þ ¼ ðRDU 1 ðaÞ; RDU 2 ðaÞÞ: Define C 0 ¼ ðf% a; ag; % a; RDU 1 ; RDU 2 ÞAB where RDU 1 and RDU 2 are the restrictions of the rank-dependent utility functionals in C: With L : ¼ SðC 0 Þ; we have F ðL; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ by weak Pareto optimality of F : By individual monotonicity of F applied to LDT we have F ðT; 0ÞXF ðL; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ; hence F ðT; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ ¼ KSðT; 0Þ: This completes the proof of the theorem for this case.
Second and last, consider the case that uðT; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1ÞeT; hence KSðT; 0Þoð1; 1Þ: By Lemma 2.4 there is a function f ; the graph of which coincides with PðTÞ: Define y :¼ DenoteT ¼ SðBÞ: Then uðT; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ and TDT; so by individual monotonicity of F ; F ðT; 0ÞXF ðT; 0Þ: Since KSðT; 0Þ ¼ KSðT; 0Þ; it is sufficient to show that F ðT; 0Þ ¼ KSðT; 0Þ: then KSðT; 0ÞXF ðT; 0Þ which implies KSðT; 0Þ ¼ F ðT; 0Þ since KSðT; 0Þoð1; 1Þ: Let z :¼ KSðT; 0Þ (so z 1 ¼ z 2 ) and let f : ½0; 1-½0; 1 be a continuous strictly decreasing function with ðt; f ðtÞÞAT; f ðz 1 Þ ¼ z 2 ; and f ðtÞ ¼ f À1 ðtÞ for every tA½0; 1: Then f ð0Þ ¼ 1; f ð1Þ ¼ 0; and by Lemma 2.5 and its proof there is a ðV ; 0ÞAS with PðV Þ equal to the graph of f and V ¼ fxAR 2 : 0pxpx 0 for some x 0 APðV Þg: Because V is symmetric by construction, symmetry and weak Pareto optimality of F imply F ðV ; 0Þ ¼ z: Since uðV ; 0Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ and V DT; individual monotonicity of F implies F ðT; 0ÞXF ðV ; 0Þ ¼ z; hence F ðT; 0Þ ¼ z ¼ KSðT; 0Þ since zAPðTÞ: This completes the proof of the second case, and hence of the theorem. &
